TAC ATTACK

SEPTEMBER 1973

TAC - VIETNAM, AND BEYOND...Pg 4

for efficient tactical air power

TAC ATTACK

SEPTEMBER 1973

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Tactical Air Command

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CURRENT INTEREST

DEPARTMENTS

TACRP 127-1

Angle of ATTACK

angle of attack

Symptoms and Diseases

If you have a headache the normal thing to do is take aspirin — a time-honored and effective cure . . . but what are you curing? Let's say these headaches occur more and more frequently — aspirins continue to relieve the headache but if you don't recognize these headaches as only a symptom of a greater problem, you could be in real trouble.

If your unit has a "headache," FOD problems for example, your "aspirin" may be to increase your personnel's awareness of the dangers of FOD — briefings, posters, and threats just might reduce your unit's incidence of FOD problems — temporarily. On the other hand, FOD incidents just may be a symptom of another, more serious problem. Do your personnel have and use the proper checklists and tech data? Are your flight line supervisors effective in leading through example? Do your flying/maintenance schedules and manning levels allow enough time to include proper quality control inspections? What are the working conditions? When was the last time you ate in the chow hall? Do the billets insure proper rest?

I may be accused of being overly-analytical here — maybe the solution IS simply to increase personnel indoctrination. What I am really trying to get across to you — whether pilot, mechanic, or supervisor — is to study all facets of the problem before you take action. Don't be accused of being one of those people who are all speed and no direction. Don't just relieve the symptom — cure the disease.

E. HILLDING, Colonel, USAF
Chief of Safety

TAC — VIETNAM, AND BEYOND



by GENERAL WILLIAM W. MOMYER

At the end of any period of time, it is both wise and prudent to reflect on where you've been, what you're doing now, and what the future looks like. I know I did this when I left Vietnam in 1968. Perhaps this is the time to look at what we have done in TAC in the past five years and use the lessons of conflict to our advantage in building a dynamic, flexible, ready force.

The lessons of Vietnam were many *and varied*. Certainly *when* we entered the conflict, we had many ideas that had to be changed in the next few years if we were to be successful. Tanker/strike force coordination, methods of defeating the Surface to Air Missile threat, and new tactics in *countering* enemy fighters were all facets of the air war in Vietnam that evolved through experience. We learned many new techniques and applications of airlift. Techniques in deployment, management, and command and *control all* needed *improvement*. But the lessons learned in solving problems would have done little good if we had not applied them in our training programs. Our experiences in Vietnam enabled us to develop training programs which helped *us* take the war to *the enemy*. For example, we had to train our fighter pilots to fly missile-threat formations. These flights required maintaining formation position during high speed, high G maneuvers. We soon realized that the only way to survive was to *rely on a formation* which gave mutual protection against SAMs and MiG attacks. These changes in combat tactics placed a heavy demand on our training capabilities, a challenge we met head-on.

The survival of our forces when employed *during* Linebacker II *proved* the value of TAC training. When you must penetrate heavily defended areas at more than ten miles a minute, and still hit the target with great precision, then the hours and months of training have been well worthwhile.

Prior to Vietnam, few pilots had considered the need for electronic countermeasures support. After facing radar controlled AAA and SAMs, few pilots would ever again deny the value of this support. Again, TAC *was* faced with the *challenge* of developing the techniques and the training to defeat the enemy in this electronic arena and protect the lives of those flying the strike missions into the heartland of North Vietnam. When you consider *that* the North Vietnamese *doubled* the number of SA-2 battalions they had between 1966 and the time we resumed bombing the North in 1972, you can see the size of the challenge we faced in trying to prepare men to

defeat this highly sophisticated and effective system. The application of concepts tested in the early days of the Iron Hand flights, and techniques learned on Wild Weasel missions paid off when our pilots and their "Bears" escorted the striking fighters and B-52s into the heart of North Vietnam in 1972. The low loss rates of these missions are testimony to the aggressiveness of our pilots and the training they received.

In addition to changes in air-to-ground tactics, we soon realized the need to modify our air combat procedures in Vietnam. In the early days of the conflict, we learned to counter the slower moving MiG-17s and 19s, but when the enemy introduced the MiG-21, the threat changed dramatically. Using the stern attack and heat-seeking missiles, the North Vietnamese were in the position to inflict great damage upon our strike forces without putting themselves in much danger. In addition, few of our pilots had a great deal of experience in air-to-air combat against a highly maneuverable, small fighter like the MiG-21.

To give our fighter pilots this experience, we evolved the concept of the Aggressor Squadron, a unit of T-38s with the mission of providing realistic training to meet the need so clearly recognized in combat. This unit gives our fighter pilots the chance to fly against an airplane having many of the same characteristics as the MiG-21. In addition, the pilots flying in the aggressor role use MiG tactics, learned through interviews conducted with pilots who fought MiGs in Southeast Asia. By traveling to each of the TAC bases throughout the year, the Aggressor Squadron provides the opportunity for the pilots to test their aerial combat skills against the closest thing to the enemy we have been able to produce. This is the kind of realistic training that is the hallmark of TAC. This training insures victory in combat against a skilled enemy.

In 1968, I had the opportunity to see at first-hand the value of accurate aerial resupply efforts. The place was Khe Sanh. This classic case of airlift employment to support ground forces saw our crews deliver more than twelve thousand tons of cargo during the 77-day siege. Yet, even though this operation was highly successful, there were lessons to be learned, particularly the need to make accurate airdrops in the worst of weather conditions. The additions to our inventory of the Station-keeping and Adverse Weather Air Delivery Systems were the result.

Probably the clearest instance of TAC's preparing to meet the needs of future combat was the example of airlift capability demonstrated by two of our airlift squadrons last year. Deployed from their home bases, the units dropped more than 12 million pounds of cargo in 60 days, proving the validity and value of AWADS. They airdropped supplies at a remarkable 94 percent accuracy, attained during all types of weather. Additionally, the drops were made from high altitude onto very small drop zones. At An Loc, for example, a soccer field was converted to a drop zone and the success of the drops there proved the effectiveness of AWADS. From Africa to An Loc, our airlift record stands as a testimonial to the ability of TAC men to perform their jobs under the most trying conditions.

Fighting a war in Southeast Asia while still maintaining forces for contingencies in Europe taxed our forces to the limit. Our ability to rapidly deploy forces worldwide has been demonstrated repeatedly in the last five years. To attain the degree of flexibility necessary to fully support the commitments of general purpose forces worldwide, we needed to develop and test new concepts at the same time we were training the fighting air forces for the conflict.

In 1969, the first deployment of TAC fighters to Europe under the NATO "dual-basing" concept began when 96 F-4s were deployed to Spangdahlem and Hahn Air Bases in Germany. We have repeated this move, Crested Cap II, each year since. In the same year, TAC flexibility was greatly enhanced through the testing of the Bare Base concept during the exercise, Coronet Bare. Where an empty runway had been 54 hours previously, a fully operational tactical fighter base emerged. As final base development efforts were completed, an F-4 tactical fighter squadron arrived to commence flying operations. In 1970, this concept was tested more thoroughly in "Heavy Bare." The nickname noted that this unit could deploy with a prepackaged air base to any austere airfield in the Free World and become operational within hours. A practical test of the ability of TAC forces to rapidly respond to conditions worldwide came in 1972, when we sent fighters to Thailand in 72 hours, to meet the challenge posed when North Vietnamese forces streamed across the DMZ. Three Tactical Air Command fighter squadrons from bases in North Carolina and Kansas were in place within three days. In succeeding days, additional TAC fighter and specialized units were deployed as the buildup continued. A significant example was the four squadrons of F-4s that were deployed from the CONUS to SEA in only six days. This was a remarkable demonstration of the flexibility of tactical air power and is a graphic demonstration of the ability of TAC forces to meet fast-breaking situations anywhere. Similar TAC deployments during 1972 continued to demonstrate the efficiency maintained by units of the command. In September of that year, in order to improve the all-weather bombing and low altitude penetration capabilities of our forces, two F-111A squadrons were deployed to Thailand, and in October, three squadrons of A-7Ds left for Korat, where they replaced four F-4 squadrons.

TAC-VIETNAM, AND BEYOND

The continuing deployments under the Constant Guard concept further demonstrated TAC's ability to provide combat ready forces for the employment by the Unified Commander. And that's our job. When we can provide these forces on short notice, ready to fly their combat missions when they arrive, we are demonstrating to the world our understanding of the necessity to support our nation's objectives anywhere, at any time. We must always be ready to move and move rapidly.

The combination of ready forces that can operate from austere bases anywhere in the world has added new dimensions to the flexibility of our forces. Another equally important asset is the ability of the commander to control the forces sent to his theatre. The element of command and control is something we have worked constantly to improve. Constant exercising of our tactical air forces with elements of the other services brings greater understanding to all commanders of the principle of the single air manager who must determine the priority of air targets. Without proper centralized control in the hands of a single commander, we would see a duplication of effort, ineffectual employment of forces, and a general breakdown of operational effectiveness. The results would be chaotic. From Vietnam, we gained experience in the control of air forces through the ABCCCs. This system, when combined with ground systems, gave the air manager the reins to operate his command in an efficient and economical manner to obtain his objectives. Practical application of command and control depends on an advanced systems package. The Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) gives us the tool to turn concept into reality. AWACS centralizes the coordination of complex, diverse, and simultaneous air operations. With it the single manager can command and control the total air effort: strike, air superiority, support, airlift, reconnaissance, and interdiction.

So we've learned a great deal from the past. In the preceding five years we have demonstrated our ability to put lessons into practice. Any improvements that we have made in tactics and procedures, however, will be nullified if we allow our hardware to become outdated. We have the future to look to. And because we've done a good deal of planning with the future in mind, it looks bright.

We are in the midst of developing the first air superiority fighter for the Air Force in more than 20 years. We are now facing the challenge of defeating not the MiG-21, but whatever combat aircraft any potential enemy may develop. Remembering that air superiority is the key to victory in all other phases of any conflict, we cannot forget that one reason we could enjoy the freedom to use our various elements of combat was the air supremacy we enjoyed over the battlefield. Had we not owned the airspace, the tactics we used would have differed greatly. In future conflicts, to have the same degree of flexibility, we must be able to guarantee air superiority to the unified commander. Without it, all else will fail. We believe the F-15 will provide the measure of success in this area. TAC will continue to play the major role in handling this vital mission.

Support of ground forces will be greatly enhanced with the arrival of the A-10. This aircraft will fill the need of operating in a high threat environment, while being capable of delivering accurate weapons in support of friendly ground forces, something our Army friends will always need. The combination of great firepower and mixed weapons loads make this aircraft a welcome addition to the TAC inventory. It will then be up to us to turn this airplane into a complete weapon system, capable

of providing the close air support necessary to our ground forces. If we aren't able to constantly demonstrate this capability, we may stand the chance of losing a good portion of our mission to those who are trying to assume these responsibilities. As a sidelight here, I feel strongly that our past experience has proven the necessity of tanker capabilities organic to the tactical air arm. Air refueling increases the time-over-target and gives fighters added flexibility. We must continue to work towards an integrated tanker force which would provide these vital requirements.

The future also looks bright in the airlift area. While we continue to exploit the C-130s in every way possible, we must look to an aircraft that will give us the future intratheatre airlift ability we need. The use of C-141/C-5 aircraft in hostile and austere areas will be the exception, not the norm. The delivery of cargo within the theatre belongs to the tactical airlift forces, which has been its traditional role, verified and performed with distinction in World War II, Korea, and Vietnam. In order to maintain our airlift effectiveness, the advanced medium STOL transport is an operational necessity. With its load carrying capability, unrefueled range and the ability to fly steep approaches and departures required in hostile environments, the AMST will enable us to continue our outstanding record of supporting the man in the field. The lessons learned at Khe Sanh and An Loc have not been wasted.

In five years we have made a great deal of progress in preparing to face the conflicts of the future. We have moved to attain the systems we will require to insure the survivability of our forces in the air and on the ground. We have developed the techniques and machinery to insure the proper command and control of our TAC forces. Through frequent exercises, we have perfected techniques vital to the effective management of the air battle. We have continually moved to provide better trained, more mobile forces for the use of the unified commanders. Responsive deployments have proven the value of concepts developed over these years. Our ability to meet the enemy's threat has demonstrated our readiness.

Another aspect of our readiness is the ability of our Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard forces to meet any contingency. During the past few years, with the advent of the Total Force concept, these units have become integral team members of the regular TAC forces. Now with newer, more modern equipment programmed to replace their aging aircraft, these Reserve forces can be counted on to fulfill their share of the overall TAC mission. They are a welcome source of experienced talent for a commander to employ as a portion of his tactical air forces.

We will continue to provide the best equipment and facilities money allows. The years ahead will see our budgets growing tighter and our missions more complex. As this happens, the need for people more capable of adapting to change and meeting the challenge will increase. The future strength of this command does not lie in the hands of one man. The future is yours. We have always prided ourselves on being a professional force. Certainly our actions in the last five years have proven that professionalism time and time again. The survival of our country is our goal. This will depend in great measure on the individual dedication of each of you, the men and women of TAC.

General William W. Momyer has commanded Tactical Air Command since August, 1968, and for the previous two years was commander of the 7th Air Force in Vietnam. He received his wings in 1939 and saw combat service in Europe and North Africa with eight enemy aircraft to his credit. He has held a number of operational commands and key staff posts. As chief of the Combined Operations of the Army Air Forces Board during World War 2, he helped develop Air Force doctrine for air-ground operations. Among his awards are the Distinguished Service Cross, Distinguished Service Medal with two clusters, Silver Star with two clusters and the Distinguished Flying Cross.

the cost of poultry

by Maj Joe Tillman

An F-111E, out of Upper Heyford, England, was flying a camera target bomb run at 450 KIAS when suddenly the pilot saw a flash, but did not have time to react. A bird, later analyzed to be a gull, struck the right windscreen approximately five to seven inches forward of the canopy trailing edge. The windscreen shattered but did not collapse. The bird did not penetrate the cockpit, but bird remains were forced through the pressure seal at the forward portion of the right hatch, spraying both aircrew members with small particles of the inner glass surface. The pilot instructed the WSO to keep his head down and bottom his seat for the remainder of the flight. The aircraft was climbed to reduce airspeed and recovered without further difficulties at RAF Leuchars, Scotland. Gulls in that area are estimated to weigh between one and five-and-one-half pounds — cost of repairs to the F-111 — $18,175.38. Figuring the gull at five pounds, that comes to about $3635.07 a pound — and even at today's prices, that is considerably more than the price of prime filet steaks.

Expensive, yes, but a lot cheaper than the price per pound of a recent birdstrike accident. Another F-111, this time an A model, crashed in an inaccessible area of Zion National Park, Utah. Flying at approximately 300 feet AGL and 400 knots, there was no warning — a deafening implosion followed by a tremendous rush of air. Both crewmembers described the inside of the cockpit as "resembling a severe snow storm." They both bent forward under the glare shield for protection against the wind blast, but the turbulence inside was so severe the right seat IP's flight suit received numerous tears on the top and back of his shoulders. Although their helmet visors probably saved their lives, windblast and flying debris under their visors prevented the aircrew from

opening their eyes except for momentary glimpses of the instruments. Neither pilot could discern the aircraft attitude and the IP saw large amounts of metallic objects entering the cockpit and elected to eject. Landing on a steep slope (approximately 40 degrees), the module tumbled about twenty feet and stopped. Luckily, the crew decided to delay their exit from the module – after about a ten-second delay, the module broke loose and tumbled again – this time about 50 to 100 feet down the slope. The recovery chute tangled in one of the few large trees in the area, stopping the module where the crew could egress through a broken right canopy hatch. After freeing their survival kits, they established contact with another F-111 orbiting the area who called for a HUI/P helicopter to rescue them. The aircraft wreckage, however, ended up in terrain so rugged that mountain-climbing is prohibited.

Now, back to original cause – birdstrike. What type of bird would shatter the windscreen of an F-111 and result in buffeting (inside the cockpit) and flying debris so severe a loss of control takes place . . . a turkey buzzard? A duck or goose? Nay, brother, the Bird and Mammal Laboratory at Washington, D. C. determined the culprit was a white-throated swift – weight ONE AND ONE-FOURTH OUNCES !

Since this occurrence, several priority projects have been initiated – development of bird-resistant windscreens, removal of F-111 radiation curtains and panels if not required by the mission, studies of improved headgear to provide full facial and eye protection, and acceleration of the F-111 strobe light evaluation. Meanwhile the birds are still out there making suicide runs against their aluminum counterparts.

Is there anything you can do to eliminate the possibility of a birdstrike? Unfortunately, the answer is no – at least not completely. Many methods have been studied – the use of special radar, strobe lights, and even noisemakers installed on aircraft – without proven



POULTRY

effectiveness. These studies continue, however, emphasizing the importance placed on this problem.

The training situation we, as TAC aircrewmen, find ourselves in makes the dangers even more prevalent. High-speed, low-level flying is especially hazardous — unfortunately, this type of training is an integral part of tactics employed by our combat forces and cannot be discontinued. There are several things we can do, however, to reduce the dangers of collision:

1. EVASION. It is possible to avoid birds if sighted in time. There are many factors to consider here — large birds or dense flocks of small birds can often be seen and avoided. Many strikes have been prevented by quick-reacting pilots. Helpful hint: birds may react to you by turning in any direction but will most frequently dive to avoid collision.

2. FLIGHT PLANNING. Now here's an area where you can even the odds a bit. If training requirements don't require high-speed low level flight through known bird-infested areas — avoid them. Birds are basically low level types. About 70 percent of all birdstrikes occur within the first 1000 feet AGL. A bird was once sighted at 21,000 feet (sans oxygen), but this Jonathan Livingston Seagull proponent is definitely an exception to the rule. If your aircraft and conditions permit, flight plan for an altitude as high as practicable. If unable to go at high altitude, then fly the mission at a slower airspeed. Your odds for evasion increase as your airspeed decreases. Study migratory routes (see illustration). This time of year, ducks and geese, the real killers, begin their annual trip south. The greatest number of strikes, about 35 percent, occur in the months of September and October. With careful planning, you can prevent crossing these flyways at low altitudes and leave bird-kills to the duck hunters. The upcoming winter months bring another problem area: winter nesting grounds. The heaviest concentration of wintering birds are found in the following areas:

ATLANTIC: Chesapeake Bay, Back Bay area of Virginia, and the Currituck Sound and Lake Mattamuskett area in North Carolina.

MISSISSIPPI: The Mississippi Valley and the southern Louisiana marshes along the Gulf of Mexico.

CENTRAL: Along the Missouri River Valley and Gulf Coast of Texas.

PACIFIC: The general area of Tule Lake and Sacramento Valley of California.

3. PERSONAL PROTECTION. The greatest immediate danger of birdstrikes to aircrews is loss of vision, sometimes permanently, due to flying glass and debris. Keep your visor down at all times! If you have a helmet with double visor, use both for maximum protection. Try to shield your face with your arm or duck your head below the glareshield if it looks like a strike is imminent. You can expect flying debris and tremendous wind turbulence inside the cockpit. If possible, continue to shield your eyes until the aircraft can be slowed enough to reduce this dangerous situation. Don't hesitate to give the aircraft to your back seater or copilot if you are unable to determine your aircraft's attitude — loss of aircraft control is the greatest danger after a windshield shatters.

4. BIRDSTRIKE REPORTS. Your reports are needed to compile trends for accident prevention. Most of what we know now has come from information garnered from reports by you. If you see large flocks of birds in flight, immediately report the location by radio so that other jocks may get a warning in advance. This is especially important if these sightings occur near terminal areas or on established low level routes. Your buddy will appreciate it.

Although we concentrated on the F-111 in our opening remarks, all aircraft in our inventory are susceptible to birdstrike accidents. In the first six months of 1973, TAC aircraft were involved in 24 birdstrike incidents, and not including the previously mentioned F-111A, the cost for repair and inspection of all of these was over $100,000 and required over 1000 manhours of repair work.

Until technology comes up with a device to prevent collision with our feathered friends, you are still our most effective safety device. Keep your head.



From a collection of anonymous stories published in 1942 by the Army Air Forces, TAC ATTACK presents:

Lessons That Live

No. 12 of 17

Courtesy of Lt Col H. M. Butler, 4500 ABW/SE

HIGH-JINKS

"I was only a bird in a gilded cage . . . " The raucous strains of this mournful song could be heard even above the roar of the motor and to be honest I don't know which was the least musical — the engine or my ebullient observer.

It was during an instructor's school course at Gunter Field. We had reached the advanced stages of our training, which consisted of team rides, and it was the custom for one candidate instructor to pilot from the rear seat and the other to observe from the front seat.

That morning I was up on a team ride practicing chandelles and lazy eights. My observer had just finished an hour of the same practice and was taking it easy in the front seat. As I struggled through one eight after another, it was obvious that my teammate was quite content to take care of the lazy part of the maneuver.

Every now and then he would burst into song — if you could call it singing. Pretty soon he decided that the acoustics were not very good for his one-man audience so he picked up the microphone and switched to interphone. At the same time he shook the stick, meaning he was taking over the controls.

It was all right as long as he stuck to ballads, but after a while he switched to "Pop goes the Weasel" and began keeping time with the stick. We both began to laugh, and I pretended to switch him onto the radio, but he was watching the switch.

At this moment, for some reason, I happened to look ahead. Coming right at us was a three-ship formation, and the laugh froze in my throat. I jammed the stick forward and kicked all the right rudder I could. When I looked back, the formation had scattered like ducks at the roar of a hunter's gun. I shudder even now to think how close we must have come to those ships.

It is clear that we both were at fault, and since that day I have realized that flying an airplane is a full-time job.

TAC TIPS

...interest items,

BAD NEWS-GOOD NEWS

THE BAD NEWS – An F-4 in another command was on an air defense training scramble during a tactical evaluation. The Phantom closed to within snap-up range, and the pilot started his pull-up while rolling out of a left turn. The F-4 departed controlled flight, rolled two times above the horizon and once below the horizon. That's bad!

THE GOOD NEWS – The pilot immediately went through his out of control recovery procedure. The departure occurred at 35,000 feet, the drag chute was deployed at 27,000 feet and recovery was completed above 15,000 feet. The pilot initiated a conservative recovery at 23,000 feet and allowed the airspeed to build to 300 KCAS before initiating pullout. In this incident, the pilot's early decision to use the drag chute was indicative of effective emergency procedure training.
And that's good!

DOWN THE PRIMROSE PATH

A venerable old T-33 was delivering some mission essential parts to another base. (How will we ever get along without the old Lockheed Racer?)

The flight was uneventful, and naturally, as it seems to be with all parts deliveries, it was night. The base had an exercise scheduled to start the next day, and the ramp was even more crowded than usual. The overflow parking was on a closed runway, and along that closed runway were five RF-4s. They had been parked out there because they were loaded with photoflash cartridges, and they were not parked on the painted parking spots due to explosive safety requirements. This resulted in the painted taxi stripe not giving adequate clearance.

The pilot taxied behind the follow-me truck past the first four RF-4s with no difficulty. However, as he approached the fifth RF-4, it appeared to him that the clearance might be marginal. He stopped and waited until a transient alert type positioned himself in front of and in line with the left tip tank of the T-33 and the RF-4 stabilator tip and, using flashlight wands he signaled the T-33 pilot to taxi forward and to the right. The pilot pulled over to the right, toward the edge of the runway, as far as he could. The marshaller kept motioning him forward until, just as the left tip tank approached the stabilator tip, he signaled for the pilot to stop. The pilot stopped, and remarked to the backseater that, if requested to taxi any further, he would shut down and let them tow it. Unfortunately, he was about one foot late in his decision. The tip tank had already hit the stabilator.

It's nice to want to help out the transient alert guys in getting the bird parked, but remember that aviator types are responsible for that plane after landing also. Watch your taxi clearances, and don't get led "down the primrose path!"

IT GETS MIGHTY QUIET...

One of our rote C-130s recently experienced a four-engine flameout while landing. The AC heard the props start to reverse, then drop off. Number three and four engines flamed out immediately, followed by numbers one and two. Good control was maintained and the aircraft was stopped approximately 1000 feet from the end of the runway. A maintenance inspection revealed

mishaps with morals, for the TAC aircrewman

no aircraft discrepancies. The aircrew could not remember the exact speed reverse was initiated, but the recent Dash One limitation of 115 knots for reverse might have been exceeded. The Herky-bird is not one of the inventory's best dead-stick airplanes — the loss of nosewheel steering and asymmetrical power for steering makes for rather limited maneuverability. Whenever possible, reduce high landing speeds by using 100 percent flaps. Keep an eye on your airspeed indicator when making no-flappers and if touchdown is excessively long, consider taking it around rather than reversing at critical airspeeds. Smooth throttle technique during reversing should be emphasized to all student pilots. Noise pollution is a problem, but there's gotta be a better answer.

CONTROL YOURSELF

An aircraft control problem write-up is the "bottom of the birdcage" for the maintenance man. It usually requires intensive investigation, much tracing of rigging, and testing of hydraulic components. An FCF is usually required. There is something you, the jock, can do to shorten the man's busy work-day. Our natural curiosity sometimes forces us to try a little private investigation during taxi-back. We work the controls, with nothing but an honest motive — to give us more information for our 781 entry. Unfortunately, this is one time that the best thing to do is . . . nothing. Very often the cause of stick problems is binding due to FOD or failed components. If you work the controls unnecessarily, you could damage the system or release the jammed component. Let's say the problem WAS our old culprit, FOD, and in your enthusiasm you worked it free. Now picture our MX type trying to find the bug. It's 3 AM, he's tired, disgusted, vulnerable to mistakes . . . and still can't find the problem. Next, picture the FCF pilot . . . scheduled to flight test the aircraft with a control problem write-up and signed off "Could not duplicate" — he's a real ulcer candidate.

So, if you encounter control problems in your bird, either airborne or during ground checks, use the system as little as possible. Even Sherlock Holmes needed some kind of a clue.

STASH YOUR TAGS

Dog tags can be a serious hazard during ejection or bailout when worn around the neck. Soon to be incorporated into the next revision of AFR 30-21 is a change in policy regarding the wear of these tags. "As a safety consideration all Air Force crewmembers may carry ID tags in the flight suit pockets to preclude injuries during ejections/bailouts." As an additional note for you many-motor drivers — the C-ration can-openers you often string onto your tags for your "TAC breakfast" can be especially dangerous since the cutting blade is so easily opened. Why not tape it inside your pubs bag? Except in the case of a few copilots, there is very rarely a screaming need to open a can of chili in a hurry.

AN F-4 GOTCHA

A 26-year old F-4 pilot recently encountered a new inflight experience which warrants passing on so that others may avoid a similar situation.

It seems that while pulling 7-8G s coming off the target and jinking through enemy territory, he experienced excruciating pain in his groin area. Later, he developed swelling and tenderness of his testicles which required no treatment and no grounding.

The flight surgeon determined that while strapping into the aircraft, the young pilot entrapped his testicles between his thigh and the parachute harness groin strap. The G s did the rest.

This case exemplifies the complications of F-4 strap-in procedures and the necessity for an adequate preflight inspection of all centerline ordnance. We wonder what would have happened if he had been forced to punch out!

Adapted from PACAF Command Surgeon Newsletter

TACTICAL AIR COMMAND

AIRCREWMEN of DISTINCTION

LT COL FORAN

MAJ CLEARY

1LT WILLIAMS

MSGT ANSLEY

TSGT COOK

Lieutenant Colonel Charles D. Foran, First Lieutenant James T. Williams, Major James D. Cleary, Master Sergeant Carl L. Ansley, and Technical Sergeant Robert J. Cook, 181 Air Refueling Squadron, Texas ANG, Hensley Field, Dallas, Texas, have been selected as the Tactical Air Command Aircrewmen of Distinction for July 1973.

The KC-97L crew was on a routine refueling training mission at 20,000 feet in the vicinity of Barksdale Air Force Base, Louisiana, refueling a flight of F-105s. During the refueling, a four-inch fuel line hose connection in the lower aft compartment separated and allowed a large quantity of JP-4 fuel to be pumped into the belly of the tanker. Lieutenant Colonel Foran immediately called an emergency break-away and cut all electrical power on the aircraft. Clear weather conditions allowed a visual descent to Barksdale. The F-105 observed fuel draining from the underside of the KC-97 and advised ATC and Barksdale of the suspected tanker problem. Within the tanker, the crew's problems were accentuated by heavy fuel fumes coming from four to six inches of JP-4 sloshing in the belly of the aircraft. All communications within the aircraft were via runner. Using established procedures, the crew started to manually lower the gear. Heavy fuel fumes required the use of walk-around oxygen. The crewmembers encountered extremely difficult conditions because of fuel fumes, hazardous footing due to sloshing fuel, and no direct communications. The nose gear malfunctioned, requiring crew ingenuity by one man standing on the hand crank while another cranked the nose gear down. The KC-97 made a safe no flaps landing at Barksdale. The crew then exited via emergency ropes. When the fire department opened the front and rear doors to hose down the lower forward and aft compartments, the spilled fuel level was high enough to pour out the door openings.

This extraordinary feat of airmanship and close crew coordination prevented injury to personnel, possible loss of life, and loss of an aircraft, and certainly qualifies this crew as Tactical Air Command Aircrewmen of Distinction.



EMERGENCY SITUATION TRAINING—F-100

by Captain Wiley E. Green
FSO, 152d TFTS, ArizANG
Tucson IAP, AZ

SITUATION: You have just departed Happy Hour ANGB for Why Not Minot. An overcast swallows you at 1500 feet. The climb check looks good and there is no reason not to continue. Suddenly, and without provocation, a California Condor attacks your aerospace vehicle with such meanness that the engine quits. You make an airstart attempt and the engine winds up from 32.5 percent. Full throttle gives you 88 percent. On engine restart you noticed that the AC generator did not come on the line, EGT was 630, and the normally smooth-running, 15,000 hour engine is not as smooth any more. Oil pressure is O.K. and hydraulic pressures are (1) 200 lbs, (2) 2800 lbs, and (Utility) zero. What are you going to do?

OPTIONS:

a. Eject
b. Return to Happy Hour
c. Continue to Why Not Minot
d. Take off your mask and suck your thumb

ANALYSIS: Obviously you have a problem. The choices of ejecting or returning to Happy Hour are equally obvious, but we must not discard the option of pressing on if Why Not Minot is clear and unbelievable. Sucking your thumb is all right if it's been dunked in a martini, but otherwise it isn't camp. The most promising choice is landing or ejecting and if you elected to land — slap your wrist.

Let's look at the troubles one at a time.

A bird ingestion can be Beaucoup Bad or of no consequence, so the cause is not too important. What is important is that the engine quit. Getting an airstart is nice and beats the alternative, but our troubles aren't over. The AC generator didn't come on the line and it should have. You might reasonably conclude that a bit of damage was incurred in the region of the generator and that said damage was of such magnitude as to manifest itself in preventing the AC generator and two hydraulic pumps from functioning. (How's that for fog count?) The 630 degrees temperature in the tailpipe indicates that something came loose and it's warmer than usual back there. (Remember the 88 percent RPM?)

The Number Two flight control system pressure is 2800 pounds. If your RAT is ON (it should have opened automatically when the engine RPM dropped below 40 percent, give or take a little), then Number Two pressure should be over 3000 pounds, if the system is normal. If you had done the entire checklist for airstart procedures, then you would have turned the RAT OFF. If the pressure in System Number Two drops below 2800 pounds when the RAT is terminated, then an ejection is recommended. If the RAT is OFF and Number Two system pressure is 2800 — 3000 psi, then you might consider landing. However, the engine is damaged and there isn't a utility hydraulic system for such good things as nosewheel steering and normal braking, so this chicken would probably jettison the airplane — unless I had a good barrier, clear approaches, a runway twice as long as my no-chute landing roll, and VERY GOOD WEATHER.

I don't know about you, but I'm too old to be very bold.

oh! for the good

The following monthly summary of accidents was dredged from the December 1917 records of the Royal Flying Corps.

RESUME OF ACCIDENTS

AVOIDABLE ACCIDENTS

1. **There were 6 avoidable accidents:**
   a. **The pilot of a Shorthorn with over 7 hours experience, seriously damaged the undercarriage on landing. He had failed to land at as fast a speed as possible, as recommended in the Aviation Pocket Handbook.**
   b. **A B.E. 2 stalled and crashed during an artillery exercise. The pilot had been struck on the head by the semaphore of his observer, who was signalling to the gunners.**
   c. **Another pilot in a B.E. 2 failed to get airborne. By error of judgment, he was attempting to fly at midday instead of during the recommended best lift periods, i.e., just after dawn and just before sunset.**
   d. **A Longhorn pilot lost control and crashed in a bog near Chipping Sodbury. An error of skill on the part of the pilot in not being able to control a machine with a speed band of 10 mph between top speed and stalling speed.**
   e. **Whilst low flying in a Shorthorn, the pilot crashed into the top deck of a horse drawn bus, near Stonehenge.**

olde days

f. A B.E. 2 pilot was seen to be attempting a banked turn at a constant height before he crashed. A grave error by an experienced aviator.

UNAVOIDABLE ACCIDENTS

2. There were 29 unavoidable accidents:
   a. The top wing of a Camel fell off due to fatigue failure of the flying wires. A successful emergency landing was carried out.
   b. Sixteen B.E. 2s and 9 Shorthorns had complete engine failures. A marked improvement over November's figures.
   c. Pigeons destroyed a Camel and two Longhorns after midair strikes.

COST OF ACCIDENTS

Accidents during the last three months of 1917 cost L317.10.6 – money down the drain and sufficient to buy new gaiters and spurs for each and every pilot and observer in the Service. >

Thanks to Flight Safety Facts and TAA AIRCREW BULLETIN.



the total force concept



by Maj Joe Tillman

Punch One-Zero, Banjo Two estimates orbit point in six minutes. Copy?"

"Roger, Banjo Two . . . I'm holding at one-two thousand." Banjo Two relaxed slightly at the controls — his fuel gauges indicated thirty-five minutes until dry tanks and his primary and alternate were still socked in.

RANDOM THOUGHTS INBOUND . . . . .

". . . 'Damn European weather patterns . . . Let's see, six minutes, four more to hook-up . . . he should be at my eleven o'clock . . . maybe I should try to make it over to Bentwaters . . . "

"We've got you in sight, Banjo Two. Starting down-track now."

"Got a tally on you, Punch, I'm turning in behind you."

The RF-4 eased behind the big tanker, the boom operator talking him in. "Cleared contact position, Banjo. Stabilize." After a smooth hookup, the Phantom pilot's pucker factor decreased as the additional fuel weight required more and more power and nose-up trim. "You're full, Banjo. Disconnect now." The aircraft separated.

"Good luck, Banjo Two, we'll mail your green stamps later."

The National Guard KC-97 banked and headed for home . . .

"A KC-97?"

"Yep."

"National Guard?"

"Si."

"In Europe?"

"You bet your sweet gas!"

There is really nothing unusual about a Guard tanker passing gas to a fighter in Europe. It's not even odd that the '97 pilot is a school board official (Milwaukee), the copilot flies a Convair 880 (Chicago), and the 'gator pilots a 737 (San Francisco). The engineer and boomer are high-time air technicians (35 years in the Air National Guard between them), both master sergeants. In fact, the only thing unusual about the whole thing is how little most of us know of the Guard and Reserve contributions to the TAC total force concept. "Creek Party," a two-week European TDY for ANG KC-97 units, is but one example.

The "week-end warrior" image of Reserve Forces is dead. If you don't think so, just ask the pilot of Banjo Two. Ask the California forest ranger who observed fire suppression tests conducted by C-130As. Still not convinced? Ask the grunt about the response he got in Vietnam when he called for air support to get his duff out of a jam. Ask about how he sat back and watched airline pilots, teachers, and businessmen pound enemy positions in their Huns . . . . Of course, the Army lieutenant couldn't tell those were Guard pilots, but he could see how rapid, accurate, and effective the response was — a trademark of these latter day Minutemen. "Call out the G. D. Reserves" is more than the title of a stag-bar ballad. The Air Force archives are loaded with historical data about National Guard and Reserve heroics — their flying history dates back over fifty years. We won't downgrade those facts by attempting to summarize such a complex

TOTAL FORCE

and colorful past. Our real aim is to point out how the TAC-gained Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve Forces contribute to the total force concept.

The potent combination of TAC and TAC-gained AFRES and ANG units practically make "concept" invalid when used with "total force." Concept suggests idea – and we're way past the idea stage of development. So exactly what are we talking about? What is the total force concept? Quite simply, it is a force of people, trained, equipped, and combat ready. The "Reserve Forces" portion of this package includes 2400 pilots, 17,000 mechanics and 1400 aircraft, of many types, including some of the Air Force inventory's most effective weapon systems. If these units were mobilized today, the size of TAC would increase by almost 75 percent. That, by any definition, is one gigantic augmentation program. Hopefully, a total recall will never take place – the logistics problems alone stagger the mind, but the possibility of a massive call-up does necessitate Reserve Force readiness. Because of this increased responsibility, these units have probably entertained more staff visitors, safety survey teams, and inspectors in the last two years than they did in the previous decade. To add to their problems, many units are converting to newer and more complex aircraft and support equipment. As these units become combat ready, a proportionately higher operational load is accepted by them – responsibility for participation in joint training and TAC exercises, practice of contingency plans and, of course, the constant upgrade training of air and ground crews. Rapid-action response is their forte, and Guard and Reserve personnel are always among the first to respond to national and local emergencies, such as flood, earthquake, and tornado relief; emergency MedEvac flights – even kicking out hay bales to starving cattle.

This "week-ender" is many things. He does what full-time Air Force types do – and sometimes better. He's an Air Force P. R. man in his community, and often reaches people inaccessible to others. He crams weeks of intensive training into weekends. When he is at his Air Force job, he can expect to have an advisor or inspector looking over his shoulder to see that the job is accomplished as if he had forty hours a week in which to do it. Finally, he must, whether Guardsman or Reservist, be a TAC pro. He is – and damn proud of it.

to the RESCUE



We recently witnessed a demonstration of a new emergency rescue device. It consists of the tool itself and a small gasoline-powered hydraulic pump. Completely portable and self-contained, the unit basically is a hydraulic spreading and pulling device with 10,000 pounds of force available at the tips of the jaws. It weighs in at fifty-five pounds (not including the power unit) and is designed to be operated by one man.

The power unit is a five horsepower two-cycle industrial engine (pull-start) with a built-in 10,000 psi axial piston hydraulic pump. The line connecting the pump to the rescue device is high pressure (11,000 psi burst pressure) hose with quick disconnect couplings. The body of the device is cast of stainless steel and the arms are constructed of titanium with a minimum strength of 155,000 psi.

All these figures add up to a strong machine capable of popping doors off vehicles, prying open commercial and industrial steel doors and, with chains attached, pulling a steering wheel forward to release a trapped crash victim. With the addition of a set of cutting tips, the device can also be used to cut through fuselage skin and stringers to free aircrews from aircraft.

Since no electrics are involved, the device may be used under water, as dramatically demonstrated on a recent television show in which a victim was freed from a submerged car. Theatrics aside, this type of tool looks like a fine piece of emergency rescue equipment.



CHOCK TALK ...incidents and incidentals

chock talk ...incidents and incidentals

OOPS!

He had been working transient alert for years and was used to handling new problems on strange birds, but this time it was getting pretty tense. The cockpit was small, didn't leave much room to maneuver. When he finally got the instrument panel loose, he found he'd have to hold it with one hand while he repaired the pilot static line. He was sitting sideways in the seat, reaching for a tool, when the tanks jettisoned from the wings. Too late, he realized that he had not disconnected the battery — the panic button was hot!

"B" NUTS

An A-7 was being flown on an FCF for an engine change. Fifteen minutes after takeoff, the oil quantity started to drop, and approximately three minutes later the gauge was reading empty. The oil pressure started to fluctuate; however, no engine vibrations were felt and the engine continued to run long enough for the pilot to get the airplane back safely. After landing, there was plenty of oil on the engine, but no oil was visible in the oil sight gauge.

A "B" nut was the culprit here. A loose "B" nut. A "B" nut that someone should have tightened properly!!

F-4 LIGHT COVERS

An RF-4 in another command flew what was termed an uneventful mission, with no abnormal engine indications. However, during the BPO, nicks and scratches were found in the engine inlet. Further investigation revealed that the fiberglass landing and taxi light cover was missing. Pieces of it were found in the engine. Now without throwing rocks -- there are a lot of people who should have caught this one. Suffice to say that no one did . . . AND THAT COST US AN ENGINE.

NOW HEAR THIS

You've heard of decibels. Engineers use them to measure noise levels. What does that mean to you though?

The sound level here in the office runs about 60 decibels, the typewriter is clattering away, and one of the troops is still moaning about the dough he lost in the first football pool of the season. Maximum safe noise level is about 85 decibels. Believe it or not, this is somewhat noisier than a roomful of shouting, yelling kids.

Most jet engines produce 110 to 120 decibels when running at idle. If you're close to them, you'll damage your ears. Incidentally, a jet engine at full power will put out over 140 decibels, almost twice the level your ears were designed to stand.

What's the effect of too much noise? The immediate effect is that if you don't wear ear protection, it'll make you punchy . . . It'll cause you to sluff through your work, get too close to an intake, or any of a hundred other blunders.

The long term effect is that later, during your golden years, you'll be wired for sound!

FEEL LISTLESS?

How do you inspect the intake on an F-4? You put on a bunny suit and crawl in and accomplish all items on the checklist, that's how! Unfortunately, even doing all this won't prevent an FOD incident from happening. Witness the following.

An F-4 was given a preflight turn-around inspection. The crew chief did everything by the book. He put on the bunny suit, got the checklist, crawled into the intake, and performed his inspection. He didn't find anything. A post flight inspection revealed that pieces of a checklist had been ingested into one engine and the intake checklist was missing.

When you use the checklist, be sure and keep it with you. Don't leave it behind!

with a maintenance slant

with a maintenance slant.

SOONER OR LATER:

Incident: Serious damage to aircraft engine.
Cause: Safety pin ingested into engine.

Incident: One each crew chief killed.
Cause: Stepped in front of running F-4 engine, subsequently drawn into engine.

Incident: Fuel tanks fell off in flight, causing damage to civilian property.
Cause: External fuel tanks improperly installed.

Incident: A crashed airplane and a smoking hole.
Cause: A screwdriver or wrench left in the airplane following maintenance.

Incident: Two airplanes have damaged wings.
Cause: One airplane tried to taxi past another without proper clearance or wing walkers.

Incident: An airplane has serious flight control problems, crashing and killing the crew.
Cause: Improper torqueing in the flight-control system.

Yes, sooner or later, every one of these will happen — again. ***Only you can prove us wrong!***



Courtesy of Navy MECH

"AMPS IN YOUR PANTS"

SPO COR

spo corner

F-4 ONCE AGAIN, TWICE AGAIN

by Maj Burt Miller

1. THROTTLE RIG. A recent increase in flameouts due to inadequate throttle rigging points out two things: (1) people forget, and (2) people are reassigned. We, therefore, once again stress the importance of: (1) pilots noting the fuel flow during engine start and during the pre-takeoff idle chop checks. (For additional info see December 1972 TAC ATTACK.) And, (2) maintenance supervisors insuring new personnel receive adequate training and emphasis on proper rigging procedures.

2. BLC DUCTING. "Climbing out from target area, fuel totalizer and counter went to zero, then cycled repeatedly. Approximately five minutes later, aircraft started to porpoise and pilot disengaged stability augmentation. Two minutes later, aircraft yawed left severely. Pilot pulled ARI circuit breaker. Aircraft stabilized in pitch and yaw. Moments later, speed brake out light came on, trailing edge flaps indicated one-half, and "wheels" light started flashing. Fuel dump circuit breaker and CNI circuit breaker popped. Pilot declared an emergency, performed a controllability check, and completed a one-half flap approach-end arrested landing. Primary cause was materiel factor in that the left boundary layer control duct failed. This allowed 17th stage bleed air to enter the damaged areas."

The above incident is one of many where BLC system malfunctions or failures occurred without the pilot receiving immediate or adequate warning as to what his exact problem was. The BLC or flashing "wheels" light only work part of the time. Various efforts are underway to reduce the BLC duct failures. New ducting material, increased and special overhauls and inspections, shielding, and a sensing cable are all being considered. In the interim, we ONCE AGAIN remind all aviators that if unexplained events start happening in the cockpit and/or if things like missiles and centerline stores start dropping off the airplane, best get the flaps down and RTB — ASAP!

TO TWIST OR NOT TO TWIST

by Major Burt Miller

In the rear seat of the F/RF-4s, there is a gadget called the command selector valve that allows the back seater to depart the aircraft alone or with company. The use of this handle, or at least the positioning of it, has received varying degrees of attention even since the F-4 came into the inventory. In the early days, prior to the time we acquired the present front seat sequencing system, a lot of ACs briefed their GIB to pull it out for takeoffs, landings, gunnery passes, etc. Then we found the valve wasn't designed for all that twisting, so guidance was passed out to use it only with discretion. The result, of course, was a reduction in attention to the value of the device and

practically every ejection was solo. There are presently two valves in the system. The standard pull and twist type is good for at least 500 actuations and is changed every 30 months. The newest valve, just introduced and already on a few aircraft, is a major improvement. This gadget requires a simple 90 degree left turn – no 35 pound pull and twist. It's good for 20,000 actuations and so reliable it has no time change requirement. With either of these valves, "too many actuations" is not the problem.

There is no doubt in anyone's mind that during certain phases of flight an emergency situation could develop making it immediately necessary for both people to get out. If the driver is busy – like pulling back on the pole to keep from hitting a solid object – it would be nice for the back seater to be able to punch both aviators out – quickly. There are many accident reports relating how the back seater made it but the AC went in with the aircraft or ejected too late. On the other side of the coin, we have all read the reports where due to misunderstanding or confusion, the GIB ejected,only to observe the aircraft fly on home for a safe landing. When certain ACs hear of these occurrences, they may be a little hesitant to have that handle actuated during any phase of flight. The fact is that these latter type events are unique and limited and shouldn't be used to nullify a very important safety feature within the aircraft.

The Dash One states the selector valve will be used if the AC is incapacitated or if the procedure is prebriefed. It may be too late to rotate the selector after the emergency develops; that makes the prebriefing essential. All ACs should consider their mission, the environment and its special hazards, their GIB's experience and qualifications, and then insure that optimum use of the ejection options are briefed prior to each flight. Let's use the aircraft and its various safety options in the best manner. ACs aren't expendable items yet!

HI YO NICAD OR RUNAWAY BATTERY OR HOLY GALLOPIN' ELECTRONS!

by Major Al Mosher

A review of TAC/ANG 0-2 incident reports reveals the engines and props give us the most trouble; however, battery problems are sneaking into the picture. A couple of "runaway" NICADS brought the following response from the AMA. "Suggest pilots be briefed to disable battery through battery switch anytime undiminishing excessive charge current exists. Emergency minimal power can be obtained using the alternator restart switch according to second half of switch description on page 1-17 of TO 1L-2A-1."

The emergency procedure for an overvoltage light, which may or may not be the first indicator, leads the pilot to the conclusion that an alternator is the cause of overvoltages when the battery could just as easily be the problem. So, a word to the wise: an overvoltage situation, when not attributed directly to an alternator, may well be a runaway NICAD, so heed the AMA's advice and then land as soon as practical.

USE HAZARD REPORTS...they work

USAF HAZARD REPORT

HAZARD REPORT NO. (Assigned by Safety Officer): 23 TFW-73-31

1. HAZARD (To be completed by individual reporting hazard)

TO: (Safety Officer): 23 TFWg, England AFB, La.

FROM: (Optional - Name, Grade and Organization): GIRLING, WALLACE D., Lt Col, 76 TFSq

ORGANIZATION: 76 TFSq

LOCATION: England AFB, La.

DATE/TIME: 5 Jun 73

WEAPON SYSTEM (Type - model, series/A.G.E./material/facilities/procedure)

TYPE OF HAZARD								
XXX	FLIGHT		MISSILE		GROUND		NUCLEAR		EXPLOSIVES

DESCRIPTION OF HAZARD

At present, when a pilot flies cross-country, or is forced to divert to another base because of weather or aircraft problems, he is unable to have any of his personal equipment replaced no matter what the reason. There are many circumstances which would necessitate the replacement of flight gear. For example,many times during unscheduled maintenance while in a transient status, an aircrew member is requested to assist in the repair of his aircraft, resulting in torn or ripped flight suits or gloves or having the same items soaked with hydraulic fluid. Many helmets have been cracked when the wind blew them off the aircraft after unfamiliar ground crew personnel placed them in vulnerable positions or defenseless helmets have even had canopies closed on top of them. In some instances flight gear has even been removed from transient aircraft by persons unknown! There are innumerable ways in which flight gear is either lost or rendered unusable. Under present supply procedures, an aircrew member is not allowed (issued) personal equipment unless he has a local account. While I appreciate the necessity of maintaining accurate supply records, I feel this possibly is a case of misdirected priorities. Flying Safety should be paramount and if an aircrew member is not fully or properly equipped, then he isn't safe. Possibly the Safety Officer on each base could have a supply account and transient aircrews could draw gear from that account. This could later be settled with the transient aircrews home organization.

DATE: 19 June '73

REVIEWING PERSON (Typed or printed name and grade): ROBERT E. WHELTON, Major

SIGNATURE: Robert E Whelton

DESIGNATED OPR: TAC/SEF

DATE FORWARDED: 26 June 1973

AF FORM JUL 71 457 PREVIOUS EDITIONS ARE OBSOLETE. REPLACES AF FORM 471, DEC 68, WHICH IS OBSOLETE.

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS TACTICAL AIR COMMAND
LANGLEY AIR FORCE BASE, VIRGINIA 23665

REPLY TO ATTN OF: SEP/3814

SUBJECT: Hazard Report 23 TFW-73-31 (Your Ltr, 5 Jul 73)

TO: 9AF/SE

1. Reference USAF hazard report from the 23 TFWg on emergency issue of personal equipment to transient aircrews. AFM 67-1, Vol IV, Part One, Chapter 21, paragraph 9d, 10 May 71, outlines adequate procedures for the emergency replacement of survival and protective equipment (Atch 1).

2. This provision in AFM 67-1 is apparently little known by aircrews, life support, and supply personnel. We will publish an item in a future issue of TAC ATTACK in order to give the subject wide coverage. In addition, the hazard report and resolution will be forwarded to AFISC for possible USAF-wide publicity. In the meantime, request that your unit safety officers coordinate with supply, life support, and aircrews to insure that adequate local procedures are implemented.

3. Please express our appreciation to Maj Whelton for initiating this hazard report and his interest in the accident prevention program.

FOR THE COMMANDER

E. HILLDING, Colonel, USAF
Chief of Safety

1 Atch
Extract, AFM 67-1, Vol IV,
Part One, Para 9d, 10 May 71

Cy to: 23 TFWg/SE
AFISC/SED

AFM 67-1, VOL IV,
PART ONE, 10 MAY 71

Para. 9g(1)(c) cont.

pense file. Upon receipt of the completed AF Form 1297, a report of survey, or other appropriate action, the case will be completed.

9. AIRCREW SURVIVAL AND PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT

a. Responsibility for functions previously performed by the Aircrew Survival Protective Equipment Center under the jurisdiction of the EMO/BEMO have been reassigned to the flight operations branch, base operations and training division. Functions reassigned include:

(1) Operation of centralized on-base aircrew survival and protective equipment pool(s).

(2) Transportation of aircrew survival and protective equipment to and from aircraft when equipment specialists must install the item(s).

(3) Fitting, testing and adjustment of sized items of aircrew survival and protective equipment to individual crew members. Instruct aircrew members in the use and care of this equipment.

(4) Organizational level TOC on aircrew survival and protective equipment.

(5) Inspection, acceptance or condemnation of components of aircrew survival and protective equipment; minor repair, cleaning, and lubrication of the equipment.

(6) Insurance that technical training is performed (including AF RES personnel) [illegible] tained current as to type of [illegible]

(7) Receipt [illegible] equipment [illegible]

d. Transient aircrew members are authorized emergency replacement issue of expendable/non-expendable items of survival and protective equipment.

(1) The receiving aircrew member will certify that the items to be exchanged became, or were discovered to be, unserviceable during the specific flight, warranting emergency replacement.

(2) The issuing base will absorb the cost of the items issued on emergency basis to transient aircrew members.

(3) Issue/return of items from/to aircrew survival and protective equipment [illegible]

(1) Parachutes and/or other equipment authorized and required for flights of an occasional nature will be issued over-the-counter to authorized crew members on AF Form 1297. Upon completion of the flight, items will be returned to the respective aircrew survival and protective equipment center outlet by the responsible person. When the crew members are flying assigned aircraft on a regular schedule, as in a tactical organization, the turn-in of aircrew survival equipment will be as determined by the aircrew survival equipment officer. The turn-in date will be reflected on the appropriate AF Form [illegible] members flying regular[illegible] crews, etc., [illegible]

LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

Your monthly magazine contains many interesting articles concerning the "Job Well-Done" by dedicated men of the Air Force. Each month there is a special page set aside for the Maintenance Man Safety Award, Crew Chief Safety Award, and the Ground Safety Man of the Month.

The only articles we see in TAC ATTACK concerning our career field are those "downgrading" the entire field as being unsatisfactory, improper, unauthorized, and inadequate. The most recent article, in the June issue by CMSgt Heart, is a prime example.

I would like to see part of a page set aside each month for the Life Support/Parachute Technician "Man of the Month." We operate on the theory that to be successful, you have zero defects and 100 percent serviceable items of equipment. For over 20 years now, we have been batting over 100 and I'm sure this rate is all that is acceptable in the USAF Life Support Sections which are placed world-wide.

MSgt James M. Fears
Tex-ANG, Life Support Supt,
Hensley Field, Tx.

We appreciate your letter even though criticism is about as easy to swallow as a four-pound pill. First, a separate section for "Life Support Man of the Month" is a good idea but our limited space prevents us from acknowledging all the people we feel deserving of recognition. For this reason, we will, and have, awarded life support personnel the "Maintenance Man Safety Award" – since we feel "maintenance" in this case refers to those who maintain any equipment required to fulfill the Air Force mission. As a matter of fact, our April 1973 winner was a life support type from the 1st SOW at Hurlburt Field (all you DOLs note!).

As for the "negative" aspects of our articles. You are working in a field which, like many support roles, rarely gets the attention it deserves until something goes wrong. CMSgt Heart's article dealt with items that, if not corrected, could result in injury or death – a tremendous responsibility accepted by all life support specialists. It is our hope that including discrepancies noted on past inspection visits might prevent repeat write-ups – and possibly save a life. ED.

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SPAD REUNION

The Fifth Annual A-1E/H Reunion will be held November 2-4, 1973, at the Menger Hotel in San Antonio, Texas. Spads, Sandys, Hobos, Fireflys, Zorros, spADs, Downed or Rescued Crewmembers, and any other interested parties are encouraged to attend. Expect a flyer containing the exact details of the Reunion later on in the year. Send inquiries to Capt Jim Seith, 103 Oak Circle, Universal City, Texas 78148.

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Dear Fleagle,

The next time you flutter over to your OIC, please tell him that he pulled a "Fleagle Fizzle." The July TAC ATTACK obfuscated the premier safety awards with a dastardly omission of the USAF Explosive Safety Plaque. This dereliction has undone what I have worked for nigh these many years. After all, Nellis AFB, specifically the 57 FWWg, has the greatest and safest munition technicians, fighter pilots, and oh yes, safety officers. So please, let's eschew obfuscation and fructify our mission – acknowledge the good guys and gals!

Gerta Gysio
Weapons Safety Mascot
Nellis AFB, NV

P.S. AND this is our second explosive safety plaque.



Dear Gerta,

We've been caught with our fuses fizzled on this one. The 57th FWW did indeed win the USAF Explosive Safety Plaque. So – eschewing all obfuscation – our apologies and congratulations to the guys and gals of the 57th for the outstanding job. Speaking of fructifying missions – when does the cast come off, Baby?

(Fleagle)

...and a letter from the editor

I'm taking over the chores and slightly-sprung desk chair of departing editor, Major Tim Brady. Tim has gone to bigger, but probably-not-better things. Don't expect a lot of changes. A reader survey in our June 73 issue underlined the fact that basically we're producing what you want to see. Lest you get the idea we received no raspberries – rest easy – we got them and the response will be compiled and printed when the mail stops coming in. What the Major really means to say is that generally the results of the survey show that, with the possible exception of the maintenance field, we're covering the TAC safety scene pretty well.

You can't sell safety. In fact, you can't even give it away. Safety is the state of mind of the people who work in TAC. Since TAC ATTACK IS a safety magazine, the best we can do is reflect the trends and feelings you have toward doing your job safely. If you occasionally read an article in our rag without an obvious safety slant, it's because we can't put the bug in your ear unless you pick up the magazine first. The survey pointed out the necessity of producing an interesting, READABLE magazine.

You may notice a change in the design of TAC Tally – we hope the cleaner format will make the statistics a little easier to understand. You may notice also we included AFRES and ANG stats. Hopefully, our "Top Five" column will draw more interest and fewer rocks through our window, but we'll just have to wait and see.

One final word. The office of TAC ATTACK is comprised of five people – myself; Assistant Editor, Capt Jim Young; Art Director, Stan ("Fleagle") Hardison; Layout and Production man, SSgt John Tomkowski; Managing Editor (and world's greatest secretary), Mariella W. Andrews. You may notice we don't have a writer on the staff and I'm getting finger cramps from imitating one. And that's where you come in. SEND US ARTICLES – PLEASE. You are close to the action. You know what you and your fellow-workers want to read. Most of all, our effectiveness in getting the word out depends on feedback from the field, so when you have a gripe about how things are done, try putting it down on paper. You don't have to be another Hemingway to get the point across. You don't even have to have the article typed if your handwriting is legible. All you really have to do is put it down on paper and mail it to us, using the address inside the front cover – we really appreciate it. "Till next time ------ *Ed*.

TACTICAL AIR COMMAND

Maintenance Man Safety Award

Technical Sergeant Isaias Hernandez, 4500 Consolidated Aircraft Maintenance Squadron, 4500 Air Base Wing, Langley Air Force Base, Virginia, has been selected to receive the TAC Maintenance Man Safety Award for July 1973. Sergeant Hernandez will receive a letter of appreciation from the Commander of Tactical Air Command and a Certificate.

TSGT HERNANDEZ

TACTICAL AIR COMMAND

Crew Chief Safety Award

Staff Sergeant Gerald L. Henry, 316 Organizational Maintenance Squadron, 316 Tactical Airlift Wing, Langley Air Force Base, Virginia, has been selected to receive the TAC Crew Chief Safety Award for July 1973. Sergeant Henry will receive a letter of appreciation from the Commander of Tactical Air Command and a Certificate.

SSGT HENRY

TACTICAL AIR COMMAND

Ground Safety Man of the Month

Technical Sergeant Timothy J. Woodlock, 834 Munitions Maintenance Squadron, 1st Special Operations Wing, Hurlburt Field, Florida, has been selected to receive the TAC Ground Safety Man of the Month Award for July 1973. Sergeant Woodlock will receive a letter of appreciation from the Commander of Tactical Air Command and a Certificate.

TSGT WOODLOCK

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TAC TALLY

	TAC			ANG			AFRes		
	JUL	THRU JUL		JUL	THRU JUL		JUL	THRU JUL	
		1973	1972		1973	1972		1973	1972
TOTAL ACFT. ACCIDENTS ►	2	26	29	1	13	13	0	1	0
MAJOR ACFT. ACCIDENTS ►	2	20	19	0	8	10	0	1	0
AIRCREW FATALITIES ►	1	13	28	0	1	2	0	2	0
TOTAL EJECTIONS ►	2	19	21	0	7	5	0	1	0
SUCCESSFUL EJECTIONS ►	2	13	13	0	6	5	0	0	0

TAC'S TOP "5"

FIGHTER/RECCE WINGS		
ACCIDENT-FREE MONTHS		
31	67 TRW	TAC
31	162 TFTG	ANG
30	4 TFW	TAC
24	184 TFTG	ANG
22	122 TFW	ANG

AIRLIFT/REFUELING WINGS		
ACCIDENT-FREE MONTHS		
95	136 ARW	ANG
88	316 TAW	TAC
80	313 TAW	TAC
48	126 ARW	ANG
47	463 TAW	TAC

SPECIAL UNITS		
ACCIDENT-FREE MONTHS		
106	2 ADGP	TAC
75	DET 1, D.C.	ANG
54	DET 1, N.MEX.	ANG
37	71 TASG	TAC
36	68 TASG	TAC

MAJOR ACCIDENT COMPARISON RATE 72–73

		JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
TAC	72	0	.8	1.6	2.8	4.0	4.8	4.2					
	73	5.0	5.1	5.1	4.2	4.3	5.0	4.7					
ANG	72	0	0	6.3	8.1	6.3	5.1	6.2					
	73	8.5	8.6	6.8	5.0	4.7	5.1	4.3					
AFRes	72	0	0	0	0	0	0	0					
	73	14.9	6.7	4.1	3.2	1.8	1.5	1.4					

FLEAGLE